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INTRODUCTION
Being famous is big business.
Controlling the use of that fame is big business as well. If, as
Andy Warhol claimed, each of us will experience fifteen minutes
of fame,' the entertainment industry seems intent on making
money from every second of exposure. Celebrity faces and names
* J.D. Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, December 1993; M.A.
(journalism) Indiana University-Bloomington, 1990; B.M. DePauw University, 1985. The
Author wishes to thank Professor Mark Conrad, Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical
Studies in the Graduate School of Business at Fordham University, for suggesting a
musical exploration of this legal topic. The Author is also grateful to Reena Shah
Stamets of the St. Petersburg Times for her help in reviewing and editing this Note.
1. JOHN BARTLEIT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 908 (Emily Morison Beck et al. eds.,
15th ed. 1980).
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adom gym shoes, computer games, children's toys, salad dressing,
weight-loss products, lunch boxes, and any number of other items.
Commercial endorsements are a huge industry.
Originally treated as a branch of the right of privacy, the right
of publicity has grown in breadth and subtlety as it has established
its own independent life.' The right of publicity helps protect the
commercial interests the well-known have in being well-known.
The value of such rights has grown as technology and markets
present new possibilities for exploiting aspects of personality.
The right of publicity protects property rights in one's name,
image, or likeness.3 This right encompasses not only obvious
depiction through renderings,4 but also anything that suggests a
celebrity, such as an automobile,' fictional character,6 phrase,7
or physical movement.8
While courts have generally supported the efforts of celebri-
ties to prevent the unauthorized commercial exploitation of their
physical appearance, names, or personal statistics, the courts had
turned a "tin ear" to the idea that the voice can be as significant
an identifier as name or likeness.9
However, this changed with the landmark decision of Midler
v. Ford Motor Co.1 ° In Midler, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized a common law right of publicity in the
voice." A jury awarded Midler $400,000 in October 1989.12
2. J. THoMAs MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.1[B][2]
(1993).
3. 2 THoMAs D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 19.04, at 19-4 (2d ed. 1992)
(citing Hogan v. A.S. Barnes Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957)).
4. 2 id. § 19.13, at 19-29 n.7.
5. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
6. See, e.g., 2 SELZ ET AL., supra note 3, § 18.07.
7. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987).
8. See, e.g., 2 SELZ ET AL., supra note 3, § 18.15.
9. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4.14[A].
10. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), appeal after remand
sub nom. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1513, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
11. Id. at 463.
12. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4.14[C][2].
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The facts in Midler provided a compelling argument for the
plaintiff. Ford admitted hiring one of Midler's former backup
singers and directing her to sound as much like Midler as
possible. 3 Midler, who had a long history of avoiding commer-
cial endorsements, 4 had refused the company's offer to do the
ad herself. When the backup singer produced an uncannily Midler-
like performance that even fooled Midler's friends, the wounded
chanteuse sued.15 The appellate court held that Ford and its
advertising agency had "misappropriated" Midler's voice,
plundering for itself an aspect of the singer's personality that was
hers to control and not Ford's to make use of without authoriza-
tion.16
On the heels of the Midler decision, singer Tom Waits sued
Frito-Lay for a Doritos radio commercial that featured a vocalist
singing in a style that many people thought suggested Waits. 7
Although the commercial used an original tune never associated
with Waits, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Midler and a trial court
award that included $2 million in punitive damages for voice
misappropriation. 8 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both
Midler 9 and Waits.
20
The Waits decision represents a dramatic expansion of the
publicity right defined in Midler. In the Midler case, Ford's
advertising agency admitted trying to imitate Midler in a version
of a song she made a hit.2 ' In Waits, Frito-Lay, like Ford, could
not use the singer who had inspired the commercial idea.22
Unlike Ford, however, Frito-Lay's sound-alike was given an
13. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
14. Id. at 461-62.
15. Id. at 462.
16. Id. at 463.
17. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993).
18. Id. at 1104.
19. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1513, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
20. Waits, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
21. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988), appeal after
remand sub nom. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513, and cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
22. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
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original tune to sing, a tune never associated with the plaintiff.
The court expanded the publicity right in voice beyond association
with a particular song to a point not easily determinable.
Both on their facts and reasoning, Midler and Waits should
be seen as exploring the right of publicity in the singing voice.
Further, Midler and Waits and the tort of voice misappropriation
do not stand for protection against digital sampling or some other
use of the singer's actual voice, but for the principle that some
stylistic aspects of the voice are definable, extractible, and
defensible against unauthorized use under a right of publicity
theory.
This Note argues against such a principle. First, Midler and
Waits only vaguely define the publicity right they intend to
protect, arguably because the right of publicity in the singing voice
is probably undefinable, particularly through the courts. This is
especially true when such a right is used to block the commercial
use of unidentified, sound-alike singers. Second, even if the
publicity right can be defined, and Midler and Waits do so, the
public policies underlying the right of publicity do not support
extending that right to the singing voice in order to protect against
the use of sound-alikes in commercials.
This Note argues that Waits represents an unwarranted
expansion of Midler, which is itself a questionably legitimate
growth of the right of publicity. While these decisions seem to
represent a victory for artists over commercial interests, protection
of the singing voice from imitation under a right of publicity
theory actually ignores long-established musical values, misinter-
prets the purposes of the right of publicity, and provides a windfall
to celebrity singers.
Part I of this Note looks at the aspects of individual identity
protected under the right of publicity and prior case law regarding
a right of publicity in vocal style. Part II looks at the definition of
identity protected in Midler and Waits and the way in which that
identity is demonstrated. Part III explores the policy arguments
underlying the right of publicity in general and the protection of
personality through the voice in particular. This Note concludes
that extending the right to include subtle aspects of singing style
[Vol. 46
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would strangle creativity and unjustly reward a handful of well-
known celebrity singers.
I. PROTECTION UNDER THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity is really a creature born of modem
mass media.23 While its origins are clearly found within the right
to privacy outlined in the seminal 1890 article by Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis,24 mass media and the emergence of modem
celebrity showed that the "right to be let alone" did not address
the concerns of people who desired the intrusive light of public
attention. "In reality the injury to sensibilities concept does not
normally meaningfully apply when a person routinely permits
advertising uses of his name or picture.... The harm resides not
in the use of his likeness but in the user's failure to pay.
25
The first case expressly recognizing a right of publicity was
Haelen Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.26 Haelen
Laboratories concerned the unauthorized use of a baseball player's
photo by the defendant after the player had signed a contract
conveying to the plaintiff the exclusive right to use the photo.
While the defendant claimed that the only right invaded was the
baseball player's personal right of privacy, which is not alienable,
the court established the property right in the right of publicity,
which it said was conveyed by a contract.2 7
Although courts have mixed the attributes of the right of
privacy and the right of publicity, the trend has been toward a
recognition of a right of publicity independent from the right of
privacy.28 The scope of the right of publicity has traditionally
23. See Christopher Pesce, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right of Publicity
Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782, 790 (1990).
24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1890); see also Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203, 203-04 (1954).
25. James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Name, Likenesses, and Personal
Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 641 (1973).
26. Haelen Lab., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
27. Id. at 868.
28. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.10[A], at 1-40.
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been defined as encompassing name and likeness.29 The scope of
rights protected is greater than that."
Several policies underlying the right of publicity help
describe the particular contents of the right as well. The right of
publicity, like the right of privacy, protects the use of one's
identity. It protects against a defendant's "getting free some aspect
of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which
defendant would normally have to pay."31 The right of publicity
is also said to encourage creative activity, and so protects those
things that a person has acquired through long practice, skill, and
achievement.32
A. Name
The right of publicity, as well as the right of privacy, protects
against the unauthorized commercial use of celebrity names.33
Name has a wide definition. A group name,34 a stage name,35
and the legal name of a personality3 6 are all protected from
unauthorized commercial use.
Infringement of the right of publicity, however, requires more
than the simple coincidence of sameness.37 There must be "some
'plus factors'--other elements of similarity of context between the
plaintiff and the use by the defendant. 38
B. Likeness
A celebrity's right of publicity encompasses not only
photographs, but practically any recognizable visual rendering.
This right protects against the use of look-alike models in still
29. Id. § 4.9, at 4-49.
30. Id.
31. See id. § 2.3.
32. See Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Brdcst. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
33. See 2 SELZ ET AL., supra note 3, § 19.07.
34. 2 id. § 19.10.
35. 2 id. § 19.09.
36. 2 id. § 19.08.




photography, motion pictures, television, and live performance.39
As with name and other aspects of identity under the right of
publicity, surrounding cues that might suggest a celebrity connec-
tion are also factored into the equation to determine whether the
use is infringement.4"
The outer limits of the protection of likeness were reached
recently in White v. Samsung.41 There, Vanna White, the letter-
turning hostess of the game show Wheel of Fortune, successfully
sued Samsung for infringing her right of publicity in a teleision
commercial. The commercial showed a letter-turning robot
wearing a blond wig, and White successfully claimed that
Samsung was trying to trade on her well-known identity.42
C. Identity
While "identity" is the third portion of the classic right of
privacy, its precise content and parameters are less well defined
than name and likeness. At its essence, the right of publicity is
intended to control the use of "identity," and the right seems
bound only by the ingenuity of lawyers and the indulgence of the
courts.
In a case significant to the right of publicity in general, and
the Waits and Midler decisions in particular, use of a photograph
of a famous race car driver's car was found to infringe on the
driver's "proprietary interest in his own identity." There, the
defendant, a cigarette manufacturer, used a photograph of several
race cars that included the plaintiffs car. Although the plaintiff
was not identifiable, the number on the car was changed, and a
spoiler with the cigarette's name was added to the car,' the
plaintiff successfully argued that his race car design was distinc-
39. See, e.g., 2 SELz ET AL., supra note 3, § 19.14.
40. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4.15[A].
41. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
42. Id. at 1399. A Los Angeles federal jury awarded White $403,000 in damages.
Shauna Snow, Morning Report, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1994, at 2F.
43. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir.
1974).
44. Id. at 822.
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tive and well-known.45 Although the plaintiff was not visible, the
car's distinctive markings "caused some persons to think the car
in question was plaintiffs and to infer that the person driving the
car was the plaintiff."'46
Phrases can be persona signifiers as well. In one memorable
case, entertainer Johnny Carson prevailed against a Michigan
portable toilet business that identified its product as "Here's
Johnny," the phrase associated with Carson during his decades as
king of late-night television.47
The protection of performance style has been a much
discussed avenue for the expansion of the right of publicity. Some
commentators have suggested a "why not?" justification for
inclusion of performance style.48 Courts have had a more difficult
time with the issue.
In Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co.,
49
producers of a play featuring performers "simulating the unique
appearance, style and mannerisms of the Marx Brothers"50 were
found liable for the unauthorized use of the names and likenesses
of the deceased stars. 1 Estate of Presley v. Russen52 follows
closely the facts of Groucho Marx Productions. Entertainer Larry
Seth imitated a late-period Elvis in a production called THE BIG
EL SHOW, which opened with the famous Strauss music used in
the film 2001: A Space Odyssey. The performer attempted a
full-scale imitation of the King. He wore jewelry and clothing in
Presley's style, tossed scarves to swooning audience members as
45. Id. at 827.
46. Id.
47. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 810 F.2d 104, 105 (6th Cir.
1987).
48. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 8.14[A].
49. Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317
(2d Cir. 1982); see infra note 51.
50. Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 486.
51. Id. at 494. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later reversed the district
court's grant of partial summary judgment. While recognizing the legitimacy of the
doctrine of right of publicity, the court of appeals held that there was no descendible
right of publicity that protected plaintiffs interest under California law. Groucho Marx
Prods., 689 F.2d at 323.
52. Presley, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
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Presley did, sang Elvis tunes, and "imitated the singing voice,
distinctive pose and body movements made famous by Pres-
ley."53 The court did not grant the plaintiff the injunction it
sought because the defendant's performance would not have any
adverse affect on the plaintiff's economic interest.5 4 The court
recognized, however, that the plaintiffs right of publicity was
implicated by the performance."5
Both these cases, and others similar to them, treat perfor-
mance style as a kind of animate likeness, with a great deal of
emphasis on the physical resemblances between the original and
the alleged imitators. Case law upholding a right of publicity in
abstractible personality qualities-such as sneezing comically or
dancing like Fred Astaire-has yet to surface to support advocates
for a right of publicity in performance style.
II. THE MOST LITIGIOUS FORM OF FLATTERY
As Professor McCarthy has pointed out, some courts have
generally been hostile to the idea that vocal style can be protected
under a right of publicity theory. 6 A small handful of reported
cases on point provide the backdrop against which Midler and
Waits were decided.
In Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.,57 comedian and actor Bert
Lahr, famous as the Cowardly Lion in the Wizard of Oz, sued
after a Lestoil commercial used an animated duck with the voice
of a mimic who Lahr argued was imitating him.5 ' Lahr argued
under a number of theories, including violation of New York's
statutory privacy protection of "name, portrait and picture," unfair
competition, and defamation.59 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated a trial court dismissal and remanded. 0 The appellate
53. Id. at 1348.
54. Id. at 1379.
55. Id. at 1378.
56. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4.14[C], at 4-85.
57. Lahr, 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
58. Id. at 259.
59. Id. at 258.
60. Id. at 260.
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court found plausible the argument that the commercial imitated
the actor's "vocal comic delivery," which was distinctive in pitch,
accent, inflection, and sounds.61
Nancy Sinatra found no help from Lahr when she sued the
Goodyear Tire Company for a commercial featuring four women
in high boots dancing to "These Boots Are Made for Walkin'. 62
Goodyear, which was using the song to promote a new car tire,
admitted to hiring a female singer to sound as much like Sinatra
as possible.63 The company had purchased the requisite rights to
use the song,' which Sinatra had turned into a minor hit.
Sinatra sued under a "passing off" theory, which the court
denied since the vocalist and the tire company were not in
competition with each other.65 Lahr was distinguished as a case
where the actor himself claimed a distinctive voice unassociated
with a single work, while the court construed Nancy Sinatra as
making a claim to her own association with a particular song.66
The court made much of Goodyear's proper purchase of rights in
the music, lyrics, and arrangement of the original song.67 Conse-
quently, Sinatra has been construed to say that the court would
consider only "the vocalist's style apart from any particular
song.
68
This skepticism regarding protection of vocal style when the
rights to the underlying work are properly licensed was continued
in Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.69 In that case, the defendant,
Colgate-Palmolive, had properly licensed the use of the cartoon
character "Hazel" from its creator, and used a voice identifying
herself as the character Hazel in a series of advertisements for a
61. Id. at 257.
62. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
63. Id. at 713.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 714.
66. Id. at 716.
67. See, e.g., id.
68. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4.14[C][1], at 4-88.
69. Booth, 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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laundry detergent.7" The cartoon character had been used as the
basis for a television comedy called Hazel, which ran from 1961
to 1966 and starred plaintiff Shirley Booth as the title character.71
Booth claimed that the voice used in the detergent commercial
was an imitation of the voice she used when playing Hazel, and
the defendant admitted that it indeed imitated Booth's style.72
The court, citing Sinatra,73 dismissed the plaintiff's claims.74
A. The Quarrelsome Miss M.
It was 1985 when advertising agency Young & Rubicam (Y
& R) contacted Ula Hedwig, a former member of Bette Midler's
saucily named backup group, the Harlettes.75 Young & Rubicam
needed a vocal stand-in after Bette Midler's manager had
summarily refused Ford's request for Midler to sing her popular
1970s version of "Do You Want to Dance." Although Midler had
done at least one commercial in the past, she had developed a
strong policy against such endorsements. Y & R wanted to include
Midler's version of her hit---or a Midler-esque performance-with
the other nineteen or so popular tunes from the '60s and '70s that
it had lined up for an advertising blitz titled the "Yuppie Cam-
paign" for the Ford Lincoln Mercury. Many of the original stars
who made those songs famous had signed on for the commercials.
The songs and arrangements had been properly licensed for use in
the television spots. After Midler's refusal, the Y & R people told
Hedwig to sound as much like Midler as possible. Hedwig's
version was similar enough to convince many of Midler's friends
70. Id. at 345.
71. Id. at 344.
72. Id. at 345.
73. Id. at 346-47 (citing Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971)).
74. Id. at 349.
75. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988), appeal after
remand sub nom. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
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that she had given up her stand against doing commercial endorsements.76
Midler then brought suit in federal court for $10 million
against Y & R and Ford for the unauthorized use of her vocal
style in the commercial.7 Her claim was based on California
Civil Code Section 3344, which provides damages to a party
whose "name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness"78 has
been used without authorization. The only issue before the district
court was whether Midler could claim protection for her voice.
The trial judge, despite some disparaging remarks regarding Ford
and Y & R's behavior, determined that there was no legal
prohibition against vocal imitation.79
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that
when "a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known
and deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers...
have committed a tort in California."8 The court distinguished
Sinatra on grounds that it was based on an unfair competition
theory, while Midler was making a claim that her voice had been
misappropriated." The case was remanded to the district court
for trial. The jury found in favor of Midler and awarded her
$400,000 in damages.82
The court's approving references to Lahr83 indicated the
potential for expanding the new right of publicity in the singing
voice. Lahr protected the sound of the voice when used in a
context not associated with the celebrity voice. Midler was an easy
case, then, since the court protected the singer's voice from
imitation in a song directly associated with her. The Midler court's
reasoning suggested that singers might enjoy voice protection in
other contexts as well.
76. Id.
77. Week in Review Desk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1989, § 4, at 7.
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1984).
79. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
80. Id. at 463.
81. Id. at 462.
82. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4.14[C][2].
83. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462 (discussing Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d
256 (1st Cir. 1962)).
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B. "Step Right Up" to the Bar
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.4 offered a chance to test the outer
limits suggested by the Midler court's embrace of Lahr. In Waits,
Frito-Lay commissioned a tune inspired by the 1976 Waits song,
"Step Right Up," a snappy patter song that bopped through an
animated parody of trite phrases used for peddling commercial
products. 8' Frito-Lay's advertising agency, Tracy-Locke, hired
Stephen Carter, a Dallas-based musician who had done a Tom
Waits impersonation as part of his live act for several years.
Tracy-Locke prepared one version of the ad with Carter and a
second version with another performer.
8 6
Waits, like Midler, had first been approached by the adver-
tiser to sing for a commercial. Waits had a long-standing and
public policy against doing endorsements and a scorn for the
artistic standards of those performers who did not share his view.
The trial record showed a number of discussions with Tracy-Locke
attorneys warning all the parties involved of the potential for suit
before Frito-Lay proceeded. Waits heard the commercials and
sued. 7
In addition to the voice misappropriation claim, Waits sued
for false endorsement under the 1988 revision of the Lanham Act,
claiming the vocal imitation amounted to an attempt to "pass off'
the imitator as himself in connection with the sale of goods.88
While finding part of the Lanham Act award duplicative of the
$375,000 the jury had given Waits in compensatory damages, the
Ninth Circuit let stand the jury's award of $2 million in punitive
damages. Waits also received an award of attorney fees under a
Lanham Act provision, 9 further sweetening the victory.
84. Waits, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
85. Id. at 1097.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1097-98.
88. Id. at 1106; Lanham Trade-Mark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
89. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111-12; Lanham Trade-Mark Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117
(1988).
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
III. THE THiNG PROTECTED
As the Ninth Circuit stated in Waits, "[i]dentifiability ... is
a central element of a right of publicity claim."9 An even more
essential element, however, is defining what may or may not be
identifiable in the first place. In other words, what is it that the
plaintiff contends--or the court says-was misused by the
defendant?
The Midler and Waits decisions are alternately clear and
confused as to what precisely is protected under a theory of voice
misappropriation under the right of publicity.
The Midler court noted that "[t]his case centers on the
protectability of the voice of a celebrated chanteuse from commer-
cial exploitation without her consent." 91 But while "at issue in
this case is only the protection of Midler's voice," 92 the court
admits that the real activity the plaintiff complains about is
"imitation" 93 of her voice, since Midler's voice, either live or
recorded, was left untouched by Ford's commercial.
The Midler court clearly embraces the idea that the voice can
be singular enough to enjoy protection under a right of publicity
theory. The voice is "as distinctive and personal as a face" and
"one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested."'94 The
court found this distinctiveness increased when the voice came
from the throat of a well-known singer and used in the context of
a song, for "[t]he singer manifests herself in the song."'95
These statements shed little light, however, on what aspect of
"herself" Midler, her friends, and the jury heard. The Midler court
does not indicate what a jury must hear to determine whether a
90. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102.
91. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988), appeal after
remand sub nom. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
92. Id. at 462.





voice on a commercial has used something that belongs to a
protected celebrity.
In Motschenbacher, the styling of a race car associated with
the plaintiff was sufficient to tie into the driver's fame and trigger
the right of publicity.9 6 Similarly, in Allen v. Men's World Outlet,
Inc.,97 the presence of a clarinet along with a short, sheepish-
looking, bespectacled man with thinning hair was sufficient to
make the connection that the ad was trying to imitate Woody
Allen. However, the Midler court supplies no list of possible
connections between the imitation and Midler that would help
decide whether imitation had been accomplished or not.
Waits contains a far more specific list of vocal attributes
allegedly belonging to the singer than did Midler. The court
quoted a fan who said the singer had a voice "like how you'd
sound if you drank a quart of bourbon, smoked a pack of
cigarettes and swallowed a pack of razor blades .... Late at night.
After not sleeping for three days."98 The defendant hired a
vocalist who could sing in what the court called Waits's "gravelly
style."99 Another vocalist who auditioned for the defendant's
commercial did not sound like Waits and was therefore rejected
for the part: he sang "with a deep bluesy voice."100 Waits's
voice was, therefore, "gravelly" but not "bluesy."
Frito-Lay argued that the trial court had protected Waits's
vocal style, while Midler stood for protection of the voice. The
Waits court, however, turned aside the distinction between voice
and style, and squarely insisted that "Waits' voice" was pro-
tected. 01
This still leaves one with the question, what aspect of a voice
is protected?
96. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
97. Allen, 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
98. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1101.
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It is possible that the Waits court's embrace of the argument
in Lahr"02 might offer guidance in defining the elements pro-
tected under a right of publicity in the voice. In Lahr, the court
determined that the actor's "vocal delivery" had been used to
create the voice that came from the bill of the animated duck.
That vocal delivery was a "distinctive and original combination of
pitch, accent, inflection and sounds.""1 3
One wonders, is it practically possible for Midler and Waits
to stand for the protection of voice but not style?
Interpreting Midler and Waits from the standpoint of musical
practice, the courts' definition of "voice" does not make much
sense. Lahr's term, "vocal comic delivery," sounds a lot like style,
which the Waits court specifically said was not protected under
Midler. Style results from use, either through playing or singing,
rather than a simple unchanging tone.
Since inflection, in the musical context, results only from the
execution of music over time, not from something that resides in
a single use of the voice, "inflection" is a style term, and therefore
not something protected under Waits and Midler. "Accent" is a
similar term that refers to the emphasis given certain material,
which requires, by definition, more than a single tone.
"Pitch" is a technical term referring to the acoustical
properties of a tone, something the courts could have meant by
"voice." However, the courts could not possibly mean that the
right of publicity is infringed by every singer who sings a middle
C or other musical scale tone, since this is the general substance
of all musical composition.
In short, the courts offer no minimum number or type of
elements necessary to correlate between a complaining celebrity
and the alleged imitator of a singing voice in an advertisement that
contains no visual clues to the voice's origin.
The difficulty of judicially determining the infringement of
vocal style was just what concerned the court in Booth when it
referred to the likelihood of problems of a potential licensee who
102. Id. at 1106.
103. Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257 (1st Cir. 1962).
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"would have to gain permission from each of the possibly many
performers who might have rights in the underlying work."
'1' 4
This difficulty is only compounded in the musical context, where
the court or the jury must extricate the distinctive aspects of some
ill-defined concept of "voice" from the tangled web of musical
elements that result in a song. The Midler court ignores that
difficulty, despite its statement that "[T]he singer manifests herself
in the song." ' If the Midler and Waits courts were capable of
detailing those aspects of voice that are severable from the musical
context and assignable to the performer alone, in a manner that is
consistent and objectiflable, they failed to demonstrate a way to do
so.
Professor McCarthy, an enthusiastic supporter of the right of
publicity in vocal style, states flatly that complaints of policing
such a right have no place in cases where an advertiser hires
someone to imitate intentionally a well-known performer.
According to McCarthy, "If the imitation is not designed to attract
attention to the ad by making listeners think they are hearing the
original person, or at least raises serious questions to that effect in
their minds, then what is the point in hiring an imitator?"1 6
There are two answers to these common sense points, which
effectively capture the spirit and reasoning of both Waits and
Midler.
First, the wise advertiser can avoid a right of publicity claim
by simply saying that it wanted to hire someone who sang in a
popular musical style, with the kind of tone, color, style, and
verve appropriate for the musical composition. Popular music
styles are too narrowly defined to admit much variation. If Tom
Waits can sue everyone who sings in a "gravelly style,"10 7 can
the singer rejected by Frito-Lay sue Waits if Waits sings with the
104. Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
105. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), appeal after
remand sub nom. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
106. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4.14[D], at 4-92.
107. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
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"bluesy voice ' ' 18 the court defined for the lesser-known per-
former?
Further, what happens to the truly creative and flexible
singers who use musical approaches that vary with the requirement
of the musical material? Waits has recorded a number of songs
that are, harmonically, blues. What if he chooses a more elegant
but raspy vocal quality for a ballad and not the "gravelly
style,"1 °9 that the court has said is his and his alone? Waits
might be restrained from any experimentation with his style in
order to remain under the court's protection.
McCarthy's second point, that confusion over the singer's
identity is sufficient to constitute infringement, is also problematic.
Popular music is marked not by tremendous stylistic diversity but
by its sameness. Further, it is the rare entertainer who makes a
mark with her voice alone. The difference between Debbie
Gibson's and Madonna's relative commercial success could hardly
be traced to Madonna's superior vocal abilities. It is likely,
however, that non-musicians differentiate between popular artists
based on the songs associated with that artist, and a whole raft of
extramusical factors. The success of MTV and the overwhelming
necessity of having a popular video to push an artist are evidence
that the singer's voice is simply one element used to identify a
popular artist.
In addition, in both Midler and Waits the juries heard both
the alleged infringing recordings and the plaintiffs' recordings. The
juries therefore heard each voice in conjunction with numerous
musical elements and not in the abstract. Were they identifying the
voice? Were they identifying the similar feelings each performance
evoked? Even the most carefully drafted jury instructions would
do little or nothing to help juries make these subtle and difficult
distinctions. The "confusion" standard does nothing to identify the






In short, the Midler and Waits courts fail to identify with any
certainty the aspect of a celebrity persona that has been infringed
when another vocalist sings in a style that reminds a number of
people of the celebrity. Both cases, and the critical support for
their decisions, appear to rest on a shaky chain of reasoning. In
essence, if a commercial interest such as Ford admits to "stealing"
something, and a celebrity such as Bette Midler feels aggrieved,
then the courts can find for the plaintiff without clearly deciding
the presumably crucial issue of what has been "stolen."
IV. A RIGHT WITHOUT A WRONG
Perhaps, however, extension of the right of publicity to
protect vocal style, and more specifically in Midler and Waits,
singing style, is simply a natural growth of a right that seeks to
protect the value contained in persona.
If a robot with a wig uses someone's persona, 10 and if
calling a portable toilet company "Here's Johnny" infringes on a
comedian's personality,"' why should the sound of a "famous"
singer not be protected? According to McCarthy, "A skeptic would
say that so far judges seem to have a 'tin ear' and need to have
their hearing checked. . . . There is no inherent reason why the
public cannot identify the persona of a person with the ears as
well as the eyes."'1 2 Indeed, the Midler court echoed that senti-
ment, for it said, "We are all aware that a friend is at once known
by a few words on the phone."...
As outlined above, however, defining the scope of the aspect
of persona protected in a definite manner has not been done in any
of these cases. This is not necessarily the fault of the court. Music
critics, whose job is to convey musical content and experience,
110. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
111. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987).
112. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4.41[D], at 4-93.
113. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), appeal after
remand sub nom. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513, and cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
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often remark on the difficulty or even impossibility of using the
printed word to reflect an aural experience.
In other aspects of persona protected under the right of
publicity, a connection between the alleged infringement and the
original is reviewable in a static form and adequately describable
through words. In the case of visual infringement, such as in Ali
v. Playgirl, Inc.,'14 the court offered a number of corresponding
traits between a photographed model resembling Muhammad Ali
and Ali himself by pointing to "the cheekbones, broad nose and
wideset brown eyes, together with the distinctive smile and close
cropped black hair." '115 In Motschenbacher, the court could
demonstrate the connection between a car and the famous race car
driver associated with it.116 The portable toilet company that
used "Here's Johnny" as its corporate name lost because the
phrase was indelibly associated with a comedian.'17 Vanna
White could point to visual clues such as a spinning wheel and a
letter board to convince the court that the blond-wigged robot was
an attempt to trade on her personality.'
The courts in Lahr, Midler, and Waits were reduced to using
adjectives to describe the plaintiffs "property." Whatever the
theoretical possibility of identifying persona through sound may
be, a practicable manner for doing so through the courts has yet
to be shown. The indefinite nature of the right is borne out by the
reaction of the commercial producers to Waits and Midler.
According to one industry insider, the verdicts in Midler and
especially Waits will discourage advertisers from using a previous-
ly common promotional tool. 9 "The chill began to exist with
Midler, but it got colder [after Waits]," said David Versfelt, a
lawyer for the American Association of Advertisers.12 0 A num-
114. Ali, 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
115. Id. at 726.
116. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
117. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987).
118. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
119. Suzan Bibisi, Vocal Theft Leaves Ad World Speechless, SAN DIEGO UNION-




ber of lawsuits have been launched in the wake of Midler and
waits.121
Following Midler and Waits, however, even the tactic of
using a male singer if the song were originally sung by a female,
and vice-versa, may prove fruitless. Style is not dependent on sex
but on execution. If, for instance, Midler and Waits stand for the
protection of vocal style, particularly singing style, then a male
singer is just as capable as a woman of swiping Midler's style.
The size of Waits's judgment and the surprising development
of the protection in vocal style justifies the caution of commercial
producers.
Even if a judicially determinable definition for singing style
can be developed, and even if Waits and Midler stand for such a
definition, there are a number of other reasons such protection
should not be extended under a right of publicity theory.
One often-mentioned policy underpinning the right of
publicity is the incentive it offers people to invest time and energy
in developing their talents.122 The rationale for the protection
offered to a performer under the right of publicity is similar to
copyright protection, in that "the protection provides an economic
incentive [for an artist] to make the investment required to
produce a performance of interest to the public."
12
The protection developed in Midler and Waits could offer
incentive to vocalists to develop their talents, but it would only
reward those voices that are "distinctive." Without guidelines up
front, there is no way to determine when a voice is distinctive.
121. Patti Page, Bobby Darin, and Carlos Santana are among those well-known
musicians who have attempted to capitalize on these developments. Sharon Chester-
Taxin, Will the Real Bette Midler Please Stand Up? The Future of Celebrity Sound-Alike
Recordings, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 165, 169-73 (1992). An unsuccessful
sound-alike suit brought in Levise v. Lintas, No. 90 CV 70407 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 8
1990), suggests there is not uniform support for protecting a publicity right in the singing
voice. See Felix- H. Kent, Roundup of 1990, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 3. This was a
case brought in Michigan, however, while Midler and Waits are good law in California,
a center of the entertainment industry. Id.
122. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Brdcst. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
123. Id. at 576.
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The court determines the distinctiveness of a voice by examining
the confusion caused by the alleged infringement of that voice.
Copyright requires originality. 12 4 The right of publicity is
willing to protect a voice simply because it is well-known; the
standard for being well-known is being well-known. Midler and
Waits only reward distinctiveness, not distinction.
Thus, Imelda Marcos, a dilettante diva, could conceivably
protect her singing style while a highly innovative singer with no
commercial fame would enjoy no protection. In fact, if Imelda
Marcos heard such a singer and decided to work that singer's
innovations into her own performances, she could exclude the
actual developer of the techniques from using them for commer-
cial purposes. A lay jury, comparing Marcos's recordings with the
sound of the innovative but unknown singer would be even likelier
to recognize Marcos than the juries in Midler and Waits were to
recognize their "celebrity" voices. In those cases, the singers were
only two voices from the pop mainstream. In the Marcos case, the
former dictator's wife would be the only "famous" person using
the distinctive style.
There is another side to the incentive argument. Both Bette
Midler and Tom Waits were atypical in their refusal to exploit
their voices for use with commercial products. The great majority
of popular artists, however, are not so reticent. Commercial
endorsement contracts can involve tens of millions of dollars and
represent a reward far beyond that earned through performing. One
commentator suggested that "rewards accruing from collateral uses
of [celebrities'] names and likenesses may be more like the
proverbial icing on the cake than a necessary inducement."'' 5
It is reasonable to suppose that recording companies and
agents would at least consider the economic incentive of such
potential commercial possibilities when deciding which artists to
hire and promote. If Bette Midler has the sole right to sound like
124. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); see also MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW 35 (1989).
125. Stephen J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SOC'Y. USA 111, 120 (1980).
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a saucy soprano on pop ballads, or if Tom Waits were given the
exclusive right to use a "gravelly style"'26 when singing the
blues, it seems likely that agents and producers would avoid
bringing artists into territory already staked out by a celebrity
rather than run the risk of a lawsuit. Thus, there would be fewer
opportunities for vocalists whose styles are reminiscent of anyone
famous.
The incentive argument is even less persuasive when one
considers that vocalists such as Waits and Midler will not
necessarily be the plaintiffs in future suits over voice misappropri-
ation. The right of publicity is a severable property right, both
alienable and inheritable if it has been exploited during the
celebrity's lifetime. 7 Agents, producers, and recording compa-
nies are likely to license such rights from every artist possible as
a hedge against future fame and "distinctiveness." One could
foresee a case where an artist could not sing in a commercial
because her right to use her own style had been signed away while
she was a struggling artist willing to do anything for a shot at
fame. Descendibility presents problems as well. There seems to be
little justice in allowing the undistinguished descendants of a
"famous" voice to silence a living artist who sounds like a past
vocalist.
In fact, a publicity right in the singing voice would seem to
convey little else other than the right to exclude. As experience
has already shown, advertisers who want to use a song, or even a
style of music, have two choices: hire the most famous or
distinctive singer they think might own the "right," or get someone
completely different-either by sex or talent-in order to do the
spot.
In contrast, publicity rights in name and likeness encompass
comparatively "real" property. The name of a celebrity can be
printed on a jar of spaghetti sauce, or her face can be used in print
or television ads. The right of publicity in the singing voice seems
126. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
127. See, e.g., 2 SELZ ET AL., supra note 3, § 19.03.
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almost worthless by comparison. An advertiser must still secure
copyright from a composer or engage one for an original work,
contract with arrangers and producers, and then find a vocalist
who the advertiser thinks will remind people of a famous singer.
The advertiser cannot include a visual clue to associate the
"imitation" singer with the "real" article; that involves another
right entirely. Showing a disclaimer, such as "This is Ula Hedwig
singing like Bette Midler for Ford," would defeat the purpose of
purchasing the right in the first place: the advertiser wants the
public to think the celebrity herself likes the proffered product.
Securing the "voice" right from a celebrity does not make it easier
to find someone whose own talents are sufficiently similar to the
celebrity's that consumers would be fooled.
Unlike the "bundle of sticks" usually contained in a property
right, the right of publicity in the singing voice seems to include
a single twig. It is the threat of lawsuits from celebrities, not any
positive rights, that prospective advertisers would license from
celebrities.
In addition, it seems unlikely that a celebrity willing to sell
a license for someone to imitate him would be unwilling to do the
singing himself. The risk of bad imitators, or worse, no-name
performers who demonstrate that they can do everything the
famous celebrities can do, would seem to outweigh the conve-
nience of the license. If a celebrity is unwilling to sing, he is
probably unwilling to license. The right in the singing voice, then,
is only a club.
CONCLUSION
Finally, there is a note of artistic outrage from the plaintiffs
in both Midler and Waits that is shared by the court, or at least
treated sympathetically. Midler was not interested in doing a
commercial for Ford.12 8 The district court joined the singer's
sense of outrage, describing Ford's conduct as that of an "average
128. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988), appeal after
remand sub nom. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
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thief."129 Waits had composed a song lampooning the vacuous-
ness of sales pitches and attacking those artists who lent their
names to such efforts. His stand against commercials was well-
known and judicially noticed. 3° The focus should not be, how-
ever, on Ford's and Frito-Lay's behavior, but on the justness of
Midler's and Waits's claims.
Underlying both Midler and Waits is the idea that these
"artists" had been used by "commercial interests," and were
thereby sullied. However, the right of publicity protects the
commercial interests of celebrities, not artistic egos. Both Midler
and Waits are squarely in the center of the commercial entertain-
ment industry. These are not practitioners of some ancient art
toiling in monastic solitude. These are musicians who have spent
long years chasing fame in the most commercial sense of the
word. The right of publicity does not care about their artistic
pretensions, only about their claims that someone made a buck
where they themselves could have profited. The competition in
these cases, then, is not between a pristine artist and a megabuck
corporation but between two commercial entities battling over the
profitable use of a resource.
All artists are, in a sense, thieves. Each musician inherits a
body of practices and examples from which he fashions his own
style and voice, but that voice obviously does not come from a
void. Some creators are humbled by their debts to the past:
Brahms waited until late in life to compose his first symphony
because he was daunted by Beethoven's example. Some artists
seem to forget that they have borrowed from a rich vein of
collective experience: could Waits actually claim he has a voice
more "distinctive" than Leadbelly or Muddy Waters? Music is
communication in its purest form, and it is never a one-way
exchange. Hedwig was a backup singer for Midler. It is just as
possible that Midler learned musically from Hedwig as vice versa.
Midler was simply rewarded for being famous, while Hedwig no
longer has the right to use her own talents.
129. Id. at 462.
130. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
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Denying a right of publicity in the singing voice would not
leave artists vulnerable to exploitation. The right should be denied
in the very narrow circumstances where a commercial advertiser
uses no other "trick" to fool consumers. Using a properly licensed
tune made famous by a celebrity, but sung by another musician,
is no trick unless some other aspect of the celebrity's persona is
used to create a false impression that the celebrity is associated
with the product. Adding a visual clue, such as a look-alike actor,
should still infringe a celebrity's publicity rights. Using a phrase,
printing a name, or otherwise indicating a celebrity's involvement
should still constitute infringement.
Should the courts help singers carve out inviolable areas of
expression that are indelibly theirs? Can the courts actually
accomplish such a goal? Talent can certainly do this-no one with
any musical sense would mistake Luciano Pavarotti and Placido
Domingo, both of whom are accomplished and distinctive artists.
Legal intrusion into the world of pure sound, however, is
simply unworkable. The courts in Midler and Waits were unable
to adequately define the contours of the property they intended to
protect, and the fallout has been confusion among commercial
interests that want clear-cut guidance from the courts. Perhaps
most significantly, these decisions represent the triumph of a small
number of famous people at the expense of everyday musicians.
With the help of the courts, a handful of celebrity personalities of
minimal musical originality can now claim for themselves artistic
territory that was previously the birthright of every artist.
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